Beer Marketer's Insights
Odds and Ends
At presstime, word of Feb 2001 price increases in Calif, Wisc, etc beginning to filter in. More details next issue..... Interbrew will be public co on European exchanges by time you read this; selling 21% of co for $2.5 bil..... Important Reminder: Our area code is now 845, otherwise numbers stay the same.
Miller "implementing fundamental changes for the long term," Miller prexy John Bowlin told Beer Insights Seminar, not opting "for the easy or quick fix." Pointed to 4 areas where Miller improved: ads, pricing, reducing production complexity and re-energizing selling system. "Well-documented" ad problems "went much deeper than the Dick campaign," noted John. "Weve had a different Miller Lite campaign every 2 years since 1990 and a different Miller Genuine Draft campaign every year since 1995." But current Miller Time executions for Miller Lite "on target and resonate with the consumer." Miller Time will be "on the air for a long, long time." Millers decisions to close price gaps, reduce excessive discounting and sell premium brands at premium prices "hurt our volume performance, and Im disappointed with some of our volume results." But "much" of that was "rented volume anyway." So these are "right actions." For example, in New England, MGD "was selling at near premium and sometimes even popular prices. We had similar situations in some areas on the west coast with Miller Lite and in the midwest with Miller High Life." Today "regardless of location we are selling our premium brands again for premium prices. Additionally, we are closing the gaps between our near and below-premium brands and their competitors." Similarly, Miller "found that renting volume through overly aggressive holiday price promotions erodes the imagery of our franchises. We are done eroding the imagery of our brands."
Miller also produced way too many SKUs, 2200 at beginning of yr. "As a result, slow- moving marginally profitable items were draining resources from core brands that have the most profit and growth potential." That was "clearly inefficient and unacceptable," so Miller cutting 25% of SKUs (including contract brands) and focusing on 6 core brands. Then too, sales system "was broken"; so "tremendous effort" put into creating new system, with improved leadership, better defined roles and responsibilities, better partnership with distribs and better focus. John also addressed consolidation and Millers "shared house" strategy, accepting Miller/Coors distribs. "There is a misperception," said John, "that since we formally changed our position theres been a mad rush by our network to add Coors brands.... There have been 15 transactions in the past 15 months." Before change, 29% of Miller volume handled by combined M/C houses; today its 33%. But in many markets "economic reality" is that distribs "may need to add other brands." In Q&A, John said a Miller distrib needed minimum mkt share "of 25 and ideally a 30" to be successful, and AB competitor should be no more than twice as big as Miller distrib because then "the other guy just has so many ground troops and so many resources, no matter how good that Miller wholesaler is, they can just be bombarded with weight." In a subsequent speech to Calif distribs, Miller sr sales veep Jim Mortensen pointed out that Miller currently has 498 distribs (not including Molson-only or acquired-brands-only distribs) down from 600 in 96.
AB Won, Maris Lost Fed Case; Jury Sez AB’s Public Ownership Ban Ain’t Anti-Competitive
Multi-million $$$, 6-week+ fed trial ended Nov 9 when jury came back after just 3+ hours and said AB won. Decided Maris failed to prove that ABs ban of public ownership had "actual and substantial" anti-competitive effect on mkt for sale of beer distribs in US. That was it. Maris had spent $15 mil (estimates AB attys) and sought $49 mil damageswhich would have been trebled had it wonbut gets zilch. And unless Maris wins lengthy appeal, will have to pay at least part of ABs $5 mil costs. (At presstime, Maris attys havent commented about whether Maris will ask judge to set aside verdict or appeal his rulings.) Meanwhile, Maris case in state court against AB over 97 termination, scheduled to go to trial next spring and last about 3 mos.
After verdict, Rudy Maris told St Loo reporter simply: "We felt we shouldve won." After sitting thru countless hours of expert and non-expert testimony, and presented with thousands of pages of documents, jury faced 6 questions. 1) Did Maris prove there was "relevant market" in beer distribs? 2) Did Maris prove "relevant sub-market" in AB distribs? 3) Did AB ban of public ownership of distribs have "actual and substantial" anti-competitive effects on those mkts? 4) If so, did harmful effects outweigh benefits? 5) If so, did Maris suffer actual damages from ban? 6) If so, how much was Maris worth with ban vs without ban. Difference was damages. Jury answered yes to #1 and #2, no to #3 and never considered #4-6. Recall that Maris experts had valued Mariss 4.6-mil-case distrib, which had pre-tax earnings of $5.9 mil in final yr of operation, at $123 mil without ban, $74 mil with ban. Maris had said he wanted $60 mil for biz. Highest offer he got, from neighboring distrib Tom Pepin, was for $43 mil plus assets. ABs highest offer was $21 mil. AB thought Maris needed to make big investments to comply with equity agreement, which would have knocked profits back. AB projections of Maris future growth were far less optimistic than Maris experts. While jury bought Maris arguments that theres a relevant mkt in beer distribs (AB experts had said no relevant mkt, in part since buyers of distribs can and have bought non-beer bizzes), didnt think public ownership ban hurt that mkt. Despite oodles of interesting testimony about proper valuation of Maris, no decision about what Maris worth.
Odds and Ends
AB will be biggest Super Bowl advertiser again with 8 spots. Avg all advertisers paid for Super Bowl ads: $2.3 mil.... Barton Beers revs and volume up 22% in qtr ended Nov 30. Revs up 18% for 9 mos.... All Mexican imports up another 33% in Oct. Up 920,000 bbls, 16% for 10 mos...... Large SE Miller/Coors distrib seeks vp sales. ......Next issue in 1 week.
Beer stocks shone in 2000 as each top brewer and/or parent co enjoyed high double-digit share price gains following disappointing 99 for most. Common explanation: beer stocks became defensive haven for fleeing tech investors and beer industry fundamentals improved. AB share price shot up 30% to $45.50 in 2000. (AB stock split 2 for 1 in Sep.) That followed 8% gain for AB in 99; AB the only beer stock that gained in 99. AB market capitalization at end of 2000 was $41 bil. Interestingly, AB value was larger than six of the 30 major company stocks that make up the Dow Jones index. Miller parent co, Philip Morris, rebounded from horrible 99 (-57%) with 87.7% share price jump to $44.00. Coors share price soared to record highs in 2000: up to $80.31 for a 58% gain. Coors share price up double-digits 3 of last 4 yrs. Gotta note these are snapshots taken last trading day of very volatile yr. In fact, Coors shares are already down 20% in first 10 days of 2001, AB down 12%. Heineken gained back what it lost in 99 and then some: up 34% to $36.25. Boston Beer up 25% to $8.81 in 2000, its highest level since 96.
| 2000 | 1999 | 1998 | 1997 | 1996 | |
| AB | 45.50 | 35.00 | 32.81 | 22.00 | 20.00 |
| PM | 44.00 | 23.44 | 53.50 | 45.25 | 37.62 |
| Coors | 80.31 | 52.50 | 56.44 | 33.25 | 19.00 |
| Heineken | 64.45 | 48.42 | 56.50 | 29.50 | 25.50 |
| Boston | 8.81 | 7.19 | 8.50 | 8.12 | 10.25 |
| Foster's | 4.72 | 4.37 | 4.42 | 2.92 | 2.55 |
What a great way to start the new year: give your distribs a pop quiz with the answers attached. In early Jan, AB sales veep Mike Brook sent distribs a detailed 3-pg list of 11 questions and answers on its new cents-per-case and high-end spending program. Recall that AB now demands its "E" distribs match total spending on competitive high-end brands with an equivalent total spending on AB high-end brands. This memo has details, explanations and scenarios galore about what counts and what doesnt, what brands qualify, how co-op spending is handled and what happens if distribs other supplier has different definition of what constitutes "spending" from ABs (ABs rules apply, natch).
When Interbrew announced deal to buy Bass, INSIGHTS and many others made much of how Interbrew would become #2 brewer in world, over 60 mil bbls. But now that British govt has kod deal and told Interbrew to sell Bass, its only fair to point out that when Interbrew sells it will no longer be #2 brewer. Heineken will again be. And Heineken is also 1 of top contenders to buy Bass. Of course, Interbrew still will have sizable war chest, even if it loses lotsa $$ when it sells Bass. Recall that it raised $2.5 bil in what now seems ill-timed public offering. No one is forecasting slowdown of global consolidation trend anytime soon. Finally, Interbrew could appeal British govt decision, but media reports cite legal sources calling its chances "slim to non-existent."
Its down to the wire. At presstime, as far as INSIGHTS knows, state court judge still hadnt decided whether to grant Oak and other terminated distribs a preliminary injunction. So both sides had to scramble. If distribs dont get injunction stopping termination, Heineken presumably awards franchise and 3 mil cases to Phoenix/Beehive, the other large Heineken, Miller and Guinness distrib in metro area. That distrib would have to begin delivering immediately thruout metro area that other distribs serviced. Thats no small task. But if distribs get injunction, all of Phoenix/Beehive planning and getting ready would be for naught, at least temporarily. Recall that Oak charged Phoenix, Heineken and Miller were jointly part of a "consortium" that sought to buy both Oak and sister co Boening Bros. Interestingly, Phoenix/Beehive does not currently service suburban counties Westchester and Rockland (pop 1.2 mil), and would be hardpressed to achieve any kind of efficiencies in those areas with just Heineken. Then too, if Heineken succeeds in terminating Oak and others, what will other suppliers do?
In days leading up to Jan 13 when Heineken sought to complete termination and transfer brands, a lot of court papers flew. Following Heinekens response (see above), distribs in NY filed reply memorandum: "Heinekens silence is deafening. Not one word in either affidavit of facts submitted by Heineken... is dedicated to disputing any" of distribs charges about Heinekens "bad faith," including that it supported transshipping, started a price war, etc. Meanwhile, Oak disputed Heinekens charge of "bad faith" on ground water contamination, asserting that it did not withhold info or have leaking underground tanks that led to contamination. Included a Sep 1 letter from Oak prexy Hap Boening to new Heineken prexy Frans Van Der Minne that sez Heineken was negotiating only to assume Oak lease and Heineken had no liability. Distribs separately filed a motion for default judgment against Heineken because Heineken didnt respond within 20 days to distribs lawsuit. (Heineken only filed a motion against preliminary injunction.) Said Heinekens "willful failure to timely answer" distribs complaint is underscored since it had earlier refused to grant Oak a "requested extension for time to answer Heinekens complaint." Meanwhile, more papers filed (not available at presstime) on Heineken motion to consolidate the 2 cases into 1 and each side.
In big legal battle with Oak and 4 AB distribs in NYC metro, Heineken argues distribs not entitled to injunction to halt terminations. Heineken claims it complied with NY law that allows termination if supplier has regional consolidation policy. Whats more, Heineken flatly denies Oak charges that it acted in bad faith during negotiations to buy Oak and Boening Bros. Sez Oak is "making baseless allegations about alleged improper conduct on behalf of Heineken in the hopes of clouding the issues." Heineken alleges Oak acted in bad faith during negotiations to sell biz by withholding info about "environmental problems at Oaks facility, including evidence of groundwater contamination" until Aug 2000. (Oak denies this; see below.) Thats why Heineken broke off talks, it now claims.
Heineken has had regional consolidation policy to improve distribution efficiencies "since 1998, and recently began to implement it in the Greater New York Metropolitan Area, as it has in other regions," sez Heineken, tho only other region it mentions is Tex. Under NY law, if supplier has such a policy in place, distrib cannot sue to stop termination, sez Heineken; can only sue for damages. While law "gives certain rights" to distribs, it also "protects the ability of brewers to make decisions with respect to their distribution systems," Heineken points out. Countering other Oak arguments, Heineken sez: 1) it properly notified distribs; 2) it is not obliged to notify 4th-tier home ds; 3) its failure to notify AB at same time as distribs was an "oversight" that it corrected 2 weeks later. Finally, any potential injury suffered by distribs "is compensable in money damages," Heineken insists. While distribs argued that Uniform Commercial Code also protected their interests, Heineken sez UCC doesnt apply.
Heineken responded to other distrib arguments too. Tho two NY State Senators filed affidavits that said "regional" consolidation in law refers only to consolidations across state lines, Heineken argues thats a "tortured view" of law. Besides, 2 guys cant speak for entire legislature, Heineken adds. Official "legislative history" of law, Heineken claims, doesnt mention Commerce Clause concerns suggested by state Senators and "almost nothing at all on the entire issue of national or regional policies of consolidation." So those affidavits "should not be given any weight." Distribs had also argued that if Heineken had regional consolidation policy back in 98, it had duty to notify distribs then, not wait until Oct 2000. But Heineken pointed to difference between "developing" policy and "implementing" it. Sez it only has to notify when it implements. "If Heineken had to give notice to all brewers and wholesalers every time it considered terminating a member of one of those groups, Heineken might as well give each group," including competitors, "the keys to Heinekens board room." How about Oaks charges that Heineken supported "price war" and transshipping that hurt Oaks profits? "Wild allegations," retorts Heineken, that are not true and in any case dont have "any impact" on whether termination was in good faith. What about AB distrib Dana that Heineken terminated just 6 mos after it approved Dana's acquisition of neighboring distrib? "Since Heineken had not yet implemented its regional policy of consolidation," Heineken argues, it "had no basis for stopping the transaction. In fact, to do so would have been a violation" of NY law. Finally, Heineken claims "equities tip" in Heinekens favor, not distribs. Injunction stopping termination would prevent Heineken "from making decisions regarding its own business... while being forced to continue business relations with wholesalers that have filed claims against it for over" $100 mil. Lawsuit could take years, Heineken adds, and it "would be prevented" from increasing distrib efficiency.

